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Neural Activity Reveals Preferences without Choices †
By Alec Smith, B. Douglas Bernheim, 
Colin F. Camerer, and Antonio Rangel *
We investigate the feasibility of inferring the choices people would 
make (if given the opportunity) based on their neural responses to 
the pertinent prospects when they are not engaged in actual decision 
making. The ability to make such inferences is of potential value when 
choice data are unavailable, or limited in ways that render standard 
methods of estimating choice mappings problematic. We formulate 
prediction models relating choices to “nonchoice” neural responses, 
and use them to predict out-of-sample choices for new items and for 
new groups of individuals. The predictions are sufficiently accurate 
to establish the feasibility of our approach. (JEL D12, D87)
A central problem in microeconomics is to predict the distribution of households’ choices in not-yet-observed situations (e.g., after some policy intervention). 
The dominant tradition is to draw inferences from actual choices within some 
closely related domain. Unfortunately, that traditional approach often proves prob-
lematic due to various practical limitations of choice data: in some settings, data for 
closely related choices are either unavailable or extremely limited; the opportunity 
sets for naturally occurring choice problems are often impossible to characterize 
absent strong assumptions about expectations and other important considerations; 
and concerns about uncontrolled factors, selection, and the endogeneity of opportu-
nity sets are endemic.
A sizable literature on stated preference (SP) techniques explores the feasibil-
ity of drawing reliable inferences from hypothetical choice data in contexts where 
actual choice data are either absent or deficient (for overviews, see Shogren 2005, 
2006). It is well established that answers to standard hypothetical questions are 
systematically biased, typically in the direction of overstating willingness to pay 
(WTP) and toward alternatives that are viewed as more virtuous.1 Two classes of 
1 See, for example, Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström (1995); Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson (1998); List 
and Gallet (2001); Little and Berrens (2004); Murphy et al. (2005); and Blumenschein et al. (2007).
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solutions have been examined: one attempts to “fix” the hypothetical question;2 the 
other seeks to correct for the bias through ex post statistical calibration.3 Because 
the limitations of those approaches are widely acknowledged, their use is largely 
confined to contexts where choice data pertaining to closely related decisions are 
entirely unavailable (e.g., in the environmental context, to value pristine coastlines, 
biodiversity, and the like),4 rather than merely deficient.
Despite the limitations of stated preference techniques, measures of elicited prefer-
ences remain potentially useful as long as it is possible to uncover stable predictive rela-
tionships between them and real choices. Furthermore, since there may also be stable 
relationships between real choices and a much broader class of nonchoice variables, 
there is no a priori reason to limit a prediction exercise to elicited preferences. Potential 
predictors include any reaction to elements of a contemplated opportunity set that occur 
when an individual is not engaged in actual decision making (e.g., a subjective report or 
neural measurement assessed while imagining a consumption experience).
These observations suggest a more general strategy for predicting choices in 
situations where standard revealed preference methods are problematic: uncover 
the statistical relationships between real choices and combinations of nonchoice 
variables, and use them (along with assessed values of the nonchoice variables) 
to predict behavior out of sample in domains of interest. Because accurate fore-
casts of real choices “reveal preferences” in the classic sense of identifying what an 
individual would choose, we refer to this general class of procedures as nonchoice 
revealed preference (NCRP).5 Viewed from this perspective of this broader strategy, 
the historical success of the stated preferences approach may have been limited by 
its narrow focus on answers to hypothetical questions.
Potentially predictive nonchoice measures fall into two broad categories: subjec-
tive reports (including but not limited to hypothetical choices), and physiological 
2 Specific approaches include the use of (i) certainty scales as in Champ et al. (1997), (ii) entreaties to behave as 
if the decisions were real (as in the “cheap-talk” protocol of Cummings and Taylor 1999, or more recently the “sol-
emn oath” protocol of Jacquemet et al. 2012), and (iii) “dissonance-minimizing” protocols (as in Blamey, Bennett, 
and Morrison 1999, and Loomis, Traynor, and Brown 1999, which allow respondents to express support for a public 
good while also indicating a low WTP).
3 See Shogren (1993); Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström (1994); Fox et al. (1998); List and Shogren (1998, 
2002); and, to a lesser extent, Mansfield (1998). Ex post calibration (which can be traced to Kurz 1974, and was 
mandated by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association 1994), exploits a statistical relationship 
between real and hypothetical choices.
4 In some cases, the object is to shed light on dimensions of preferences for which real choice data are unavail-
able by using real and hypothetical choice data in combination; see, e.g., Brownstone, Bunch, and Train (2000) and 
Small, Winston, and Yan (2005).
5 We have repeatedly heard the following objection to the NCRP agenda (including all SP techniques): it 
involves out-of-sample predictions to domains for which actual choices may never be observed, and hence for 
which the stability of the predictive relationship cannot be verified. That objection is misguided. Out-of-sample 
prediction is commonplace in applied microeconomics; for example, it is present in any study that extrapolates an 
outcome (e.g., a policy effect) that is not directly observed. Whether an out-of-sample prediction can be verified 
is a function of the application, not of the method used to make the prediction (i.e., NCRP methods or traditional 
choice-based methods). Thus the objection is properly viewed not as a challenge to the NCRP approach per se, but 
rather to the wisdom of particular applied agendas, such as valuing environmental damage by assessing the willing-
ness to pay  for a pristine environment. That said, we believe that even those applications are defensible. If a predic-
tive relationship is shown to be stable over a sufficiently broad domain (including contexts related to the question of 
interest), and if a sufficiently large collection of out-of-sample predictions are successfully validated, then one can 
have reasonable confidence in the accuracy of out-of-sample predictions that cannot be validated. Those predictions 
in effect rely on identifying assumptions concerning the stability of the predictive relationship. As elsewhere in 
economics, one cannot test identifying restrictions, but one can make reasonable cases for them.
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and neurobiological responses. An obvious virtue of relying on subjective reports 
is that the data are comparatively cheaper to collect. However, a rapidly growing 
body of work in psychology and neuroscience suggests that the biological measures 
might have predictive value-added over the subjective reports, probably because 
choices are systematically influenced by automatic processes that are not accessible 
to conscious awareness, but that can be measured with neurobiological techniques 
(see Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Berns et al. 2010; Chua et al. 2011; and Falk et al. 
2011). It is important to emphasize that the actual predictive power of nonchoice 
responses is by no means evident without empirical confirmation, and hard to judge 
a priori without the type of systematic exercise carried out here.
This paper takes a first step in the development of NCRP methods that exploit non-
choice physiological responses: it evaluates the promise of those methods by inves-
tigating whether (and to what extent) nonchoice neural responses measured using 
whole brain functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) predict real choices.6 
We recognize that the use of neural data raises issues of practicality, as its collection 
is likely to remain costly and inconvenient in the near term. In comparison, other 
physiological responses such as pupil dilation and skin conductance are easier to 
measure (and subjective responses are easier still). We nevertheless focus on whole 
brain fMRI measures because they provide a fairly comprehensive (albeit not per-
fect) picture of all the responses to a given stimulus, and thus are more likely to cap-
ture predictive information. By establishing the predictive power of such measures, 
we lay the foundation for subsequent efforts to identify the physiological manifesta-
tions of the predictive neural responses that are most easily and practically measured.
Because this first step is a substantial undertaking, the current paper does not 
fully execute the agenda articulated above. In particular, we make no attempt here to 
evaluate the incremental predictive power of neural data (over and above  nonchoice 
subjective reports), identify the most cost-effective physiological predictors, develop 
prediction models exploiting multiple varieties of nonchoice variables, or bring the 
methods to practical applications. Nor have we exhausted all the possibilities for 
fine-tuning our methods to achieve the greatest possible predictive power from neu-
ral data (either at the image acquisition stage or the statistical analyses stage). These 
are tasks for ongoing and subsequent work.
Consistent with our objective of providing proof of concept, we confine atten-
tion to a narrow choice domain, consisting of choices among food items. Subjects 
“passively” view pictures of 100 snacks while undergoing an fMRI brain scan. 
After the passive scan is complete, they are unexpectedly asked to make choices 
among 50 pairs of snacks (one of which is implemented), with each snack appear-
ing in one and only one pair. After completing the choices, they are asked to rate 
the extent to which they liked each item. Section III describes our experimental 
procedures in greater detail.
Our first objective is to construct, for each subject, a statistical model that predicts 
that subject’s choices accurately out of sample (Section IIIA). Leaving out two pairs 
6 In other parallel work, some of us are currently evaluating the predictive power of a broad range of nonchoice 
subjective reports. Our ultimate objective is to identify the combinations of nonchoice responses—both subjective 
reports and physiological reactions—with the greatest predictive power.
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of items at a time, we estimate a prediction model based on the other 48 pairs, and 
use it to predict the individual’s choice for the excluded pairs. Were we studying 
continuous choices, we would examine prediction bias, both overall and conditional 
on the values of the predictors. Because we are instead predicting dichotomous 
choices, we examine calibration, which is analogous to bias. A probability model 
is well calibrated if predicted probabilities closely match actual choice frequencies. 
For example, events that are predicted to occur with 70 percent probability should 
actually occur 70 percent of the time. We evaluate calibration both overall and con-
ditional on the values of the predictors.
A high degree of calibration would not, by itself, imply that nonchoice neural 
responses are powerful predictors of choices. For example, a model that employs 
no predictors and assigns a 50 percent probability to the first of any two randomly 
ordered alternatives is perfectly calibrated. However, that model performs poorly 
with respect to resolution. Resolution is high when the predicted probability is close 
to 0 percent or to 100 percent. A perfectly calibrated model with perfect resolution 
is ideal in the sense that it always predicts the outcome correctly.
Our focus on evaluating the calibration and resolution of probabilistic predictions 
is one of several important factors that distinguish this paper from the rest of the litera-
ture on the neural correlates of choice (see Section II for additional detail). A common 
practice in that literature is to report rates of successful classification (“success rates” 
for short). While we also report success rates (using probability > 50 percent as the 
classifier), we are of the view that the calibration and resolution of probabilistic fore-
casts are of greater interest to economists. A success rate reflects a particular blend of 
a model’s calibration and resolution, one that provides a sufficient statistic for predic-
tive performance under circumstances not commonly encountered in economics (e.g., 
where the object is to decide whether or not to treat a medical condition in a setting 
with a symmetric loss function). Knowing whether a success rate is high or low does 
not reveal whether one can use a model to construct accurate probability distributions 
for predicted choices, which is a paramount concern in economic applications.
For just over half of our subjects, we find that nonchoice neural responses contain 
information that is useful in predicting choices, in the sense that our models signifi-
cantly improve upon uninformed out-of-sample predictions (a 50 percent success 
rate), usually with p < 0.01. Moreover, even though there is no necessary relation-
ship between success rates and calibration, we find that these models are on the 
whole well calibrated out of sample. The difference between overall success rate 
(68.2 percent) and the expected success rate (72.9 percent) is modest. More sig-
nificantly, across choice problems (within subject), there is a striking relationship 
between predicted probabilities and realized frequencies: a  10-percentage-point 
increase in the former translates into roughly an 8-percentage-point increase in the 
latter. Notably, that relationship is not driven by extreme cases (i.e., choice prob-
lems for which one item is universally and strongly preferred). While by no means 
perfect, this performance is, in our view, reasonably impressive in light of the task.
In contrast, for just under half of our subjects, success rates are low (below 60 per-
cent), and our models do not significantly improve upon uninformed  predictions 
(50 percent success rate), even at p < 0.10. Though low success rates do not nec-
essarily imply poor calibration, these models also yield inaccurate out-of-sample 
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probability statements. Thus, our procedure works well for just over half of our 
subjects, but not at all for the others.
Predicting choices on the level of a single individual is a demanding objective, 
one that goes beyond the requirements of most economic analyses, which are more 
typically concerned with aspects of group behavior—averages, aggregates, and pos-
sibly distributions. Group averages may be easier to predict, for example because 
various types of noise average out over multiple individuals. Accordingly, we next 
ask whether it is possible, for any particular group of individuals, to fit a model relat-
ing a measure of average subjective value to average nonchoice neural responses 
for one set of items, and use that model successfully to predict the average subjec-
tive values of items not contained in the original set, based on the nonchoice neural 
responses they induce (see Section IIIB). Compared with the successful half of our 
individual-level prediction exercises, our group-level prediction exercise achieves 
higher resolution and success rates, and the quality of calibration is comparable. We 
achieve this result despite including all subjects in the group-level analysis, regard-
less of whether their individual-level prediction exercises were successful.
If nonchoice neural activity exhibits a sufficiently similar relation to choice across 
subjects, then it should be possible to construct a single prediction model and use it 
without recalibration to predict choices based on neural measurements taken from 
new individuals or groups. Such a model would have considerable practical value in 
that, once estimated, it would vastly simplify the steps required to formulate addi-
tional predictions. To predict behavior in new situations, one could collect data on 
nonchoice neural responses to the relevant prospects for a new group of individu-
als and apply an existing predictive model. It would not be necessary to gather the 
requisite data to estimate new predictive models for those subjects. Accordingly, we 
also investigate whether predictive models are portable across groups of individu-
als. We achieve a moderate degree of success when predicting a group’s average 
valuation for new objects from a relationship estimated with data pertaining to other 
objects, gathered from another group.
Taken together, our results demonstrate that nonchoice neural reactions to images 
of potentially desirable objects contain a great deal of information that can be used 
to predict decisions made by a particular individual, or average decisions made by 
a group of individuals, in new choice situations. Future improvements in methods 
and measurement technologies are likely to enhance the success of this approach.
I. Related Literature on the Neurobiology of Choice
There is a substantial literature in neuroscience concerning the neural correlates 
of choice. With very few exceptions (discussed below), that literature is concerned 
with identifying neural activity that reliably encodes value signals during the act of 
choice; see, for example, Hsu et al. (2005); Kable and Glimcher (2007); Knutson 
et al. (2007); Plassmann, O’Doherty, and Rangel (2007, 2010); Hare et al. (2008); 
and Levy et al. (2010). Consequently, the issues those studies address differ funda-
mentally from the ones that motivate our inquiry. Certainly, as Knutson et al. (2007) 
emphasize, it is possible to predict choices from neural activity measured during the 
act of decision making. However, some economists take the view that there is little 
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value in predicting choices in a setting where choices are themselves observable. If 
one’s objective is to extrapolate choices based on neural activity in settings where 
choices are not observed, correlations between choice and choice-related neural 
reactions are not helpful (at least not directly).
Two recent studies suggest, however, that the brain’s valuation circuitry may be 
active even when people are not actively engaged in choice. Lebreton et al. (2009) 
show that activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral 
striatum (vStr) while subjects were asked to judge the age of paintings, faces, and 
houses correlates with their subjective ratings for the same items (elicited in a sepa-
rate task). Kang et al. (2011) show that activity in the vmPFC and the vStr correlates 
with the value of the stimuli during both real and hypothetical choices, which sug-
gests that neural responses to real and hypothetical choices may share many com-
mon features. Thus, there is reason to hope that one can also reliably predict choices 
based on nonchoice neural responses.
The current study is most closely related to recent neuroscience papers by Tucshe, 
Bode, and Haynes (2010) and Levy et al. (2011), both of which have elements of 
predicting choice (or tasks related to choice) from nonchoice neural responses.7 To 
understand the key differences from our work, it is helpful to summarize several 
features of our analysis that are critical for the economic applications we envision. 
First, we are concerned with predicting real choices from neural responses during 
nonchoice activity. Second, our interest is in out-of-sample prediction, rather than 
within-sample fit. We are concerned with predicting choices over one set of alterna-
tives using a relationship estimated with data for a disjoint set of alternatives.8 Third, 
our objective is not merely to predict the more likely choice, but in addition to derive 
reliable probability statements concerning the alternatives. We seek a procedure that 
reliably indicates whether a particular alternative will be chosen with, say, 60 per-
cent probability rather than 90 percent probability. Fourth, we are concerned with 
several distinct types of prediction exercises: within subject, within group, across 
subjects, and across groups. Predicting average behavior within and across groups 
likely has the greatest potential value for economics.
These four features distinguish our paper from the two studies listed above. None 
of them attempts to predict choices among one set of alternatives from a relation-
ship estimated with a disjoint set of alternatives, nor do they attempt to derive and 
 validate probability statements concerning alternatives. Both studies focus exclu-
sively on within-subject classification or prediction, and they do not attempt to 
predict average behavior for groups, or choices across subjects. Tucshe, Bode, and 
Haynes (2010) study the neural correlates of hypothetical choices rather than real 
7 Our study is also related to Hampton and O’Doherty (2007); Grosenick, Greer, and Knutson (2008); Krajbich 
et al. (2009); Clithero, Carter, and Huettel (2009); and Clithero et al. (2011). These papers employ the same class 
of methods from the statistical learning literature used here. However, in contrast to this paper, they do not try to 
predict out-of-scanner choices from nonchoice neural activity. See also Haxby et al. (2001) for an early application 
of pattern classification techniques to fMRI data, and Pereira, Mitchell, and Botvinick (2009), and Haynes (2011) 
for overviews of how methods from statistical learning are used more generally in brain imaging.
8 There is both an economic reason and a technical reason for this requirement. The economic reason is that we 
are ultimately concerned with predicting decisions for choice problems that are difficult or impossible to implement 
in practice. The technical reason, which we explain in Section IIIA, is that statistical procedures might otherwise 
predict choices correctly by exploiting neural indicators of the alternatives’ identities, rather than of their perceived 
values.
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choices. Levy et al. (2011) predict real choices, but their subjects also made real 
decisions concerning the same objects during scanning, and hence their procedure 
does not truly involve nonchoice neural responses in the sense defined here.
To be precise, the exercise in Levy et al. (2011) involves two phases: a localizer 
task and a neurometric prediction task. In the localizer task, subjects make deci-
sions about whether or not to play lotteries. The goal of the task is to localize areas 
of the brain involved in valuation computations for each individual subject. In the 
prediction task, subjects are passively shown pictures of various types of goods 
(DVDs, CDs, stationary, monetary lotteries) and neural responses in the value areas 
identified in the localizer task are taken for each subject and good. After scanning, 
subjects make choices for every possible two-element subset of the items, repeated 
twice. Several differences between their design and ours deserve emphasis. First, 
we predict choices on entirely new choice sets: in our task the choice pair consists 
of two new items, neither of which was used in fitting our model. Second, in Levy 
et al. (2011) subjects are also asked, every few trials, to make a purchase decision 
regarding the same stimuli used in the prediction task. Although these trials are not 
used in their neurometric prediction exercise, there is a concern that the mere pres-
ence of interspersed choice trials alters a subject’s outlook on the items in question, 
so that they treat the passive trials more like actual purchase decisions. These differ-
ences between our task and that of Levy et al. (2011) are likely to make our exercise 
relatively more difficult than theirs. Finally, we employ a different prediction meth-
odology that makes use of all the voxels in the brain rather than a specific region. In 
practice we are able to improve modestly upon the overall success rates achieved by 
Levy et al. (2011), despite the greater difficulty of the task.
The current paper also bears on the debate over the role of neuroeconomics within 
the broader field of economics. Various possibilities, such as the potential to develop 
useful neural tests of economic theories, remain controversial (see, for example, the 
contrasting views of Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005; Gul and Pesendorfer 
2008; and Bernheim 2009). In contrast, it is hard to imagine even a traditionalist 
objecting to our agenda on the grounds that it is orthogonal to the goals of the field 
(in that our goals coincide with those of the stated preference method), or that it pur-
sues those goals in a manner that is conceptually illegitimate (in that the task at hand 
is simply one of predicting an outcome using statistical models along with informa-
tion that one could in principle collect). A skeptic might well question whether the 
method will prove useful in practice, but that is an empirical question, and hence one 
that should be resolved on the basis of evidence rather than prior belief.
II. Experimental Design
A. Procedures
Thirty-five right-handed subjects participated in the experiment (age range: 19 to 
36 years old, 11 female).9 Subjects were prescreened to ensure that they regularly 
9 Subjects were recruited at Caltech, and the Caltech Institutional Review Board approved the experimental 
procedures.
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ate the types of foods used in the experiment, and that they met the standard crite-
ria required for the safe and reliable acquisition of fMRI data. Subjects were paid 
$100 for participating, and were offered a $10 bonus for limiting their head motion 
during the fMRI task (which, if excessive, invalidates the procedure). Despite these 
incentives, in-scanner head motion for eight subjects exceeded a prespecified limit 
of 2mm in any direction during a scanner run. After excluding those eight subjects, 
27 usable subjects remained.
Subjects were instructed to refrain from eating or drinking anything other than 
water for four hours prior to the experiment. At the outset of a session, they were 
advised that the experiment would consist of three stages, and that they would 
receive the instructions for each stage only after completing the previous stage.10 
Thus, as described below, when viewing images of snack foods in stage 1, subjects 
were not aware that they would subsequently face choices among pairs of those 
items in stage 2.
stage 1: Passive Viewing of Foods during f Mri scan.—In the first stage, sub-
jects viewed images of 100 different snack foods while we measured their neural 
responses (see Figure A1 of the online Appendix for sample images, and Table A1 
of the online Appendix for a list of all foods used in the experiment). Foods were 
shown in randomized order with each item appearing three times. Each image was 
visible for 2.75 seconds. Between images, a small white fixation cross centered on a 
black screen was shown for 8.25 seconds. For technical reasons related to the acqui-
sition of the neural data, each session was divided into six identical blocks each 
consisting of 50 image presentations, separated by breaks of roughly one minute.
To enhance the psychological salience of the images, we told subjects that they 
would be required to eat at least three spoonfuls of one of the food items at the end 
of the session. With 50 percent probability, the item would be selected at random, 
and with 50 percent probability it would be determined in a subsequent stage of the 
experiment. However, subjects were not told that that they would be asked to make 
choices among the alternatives.
Given the tedious nature of the task, we inserted five additional “catch” trials 
at random intervals within every block. During each such trial, the subject was 
instructed to press a button indicating whether the displayed item was sweet or salty. 
Subjects were given a maximum of 2.75 seconds to respond, after which a fixation 
cross screen appeared for 8.25 seconds. The foods shown in the catch trials were 
different from those used in the passive viewing trials, and we did not use the neu-
ral responses from the catch trials in the prediction exercises described below. In 
93.1 percent of the catch trials, subjects responded within the time allowed, which 
suggests that they attended to the images.11
We collected measures of neural activity using BOLD-fMRI (blood-oxygenated 
level dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging).12 Instead of making 
10 A copy of the instructions is included in the online Appendix.
11 For one subject, we did not observe any responses to catch trials during the last two blocks. This subject is 
included in our analyses, but excluding him does not affect our results substantially.
12 The fMRI data were collected at the Caltech Brain Imaging Center using a Siemens 3T Trio scanner. We 
acquired gradient-echo T2* weighted echo planar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. We used an oblique  acquisition 
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assumptions as to which brain regions were likely to generate predictive nonchoice 
responses, we measured activity throughout the entire brain, and used all of the data 
in our prediction exercises. It is natural to conjecture that brain regions previously 
shown to be involved in valuation, such as the medial prefrontal cortex or the ven-
tral striatum,13 will play critical roles in predicting choices. However, we decided 
to carry out our prediction exercise using the entire set of brain responses for three 
reasons. First, we wanted to demonstrate that the NCRP methodology proposed here 
does not depend on knowledge of which brain circuits are involved in the choice 
process, or how to measure their activity. Second, the usefulness of a brain region 
for our predictive task depends on: (i) how cleanly we can measure neural activ-
ity in the region; (ii) how well that activity correlates with automatic valuations; 
and (iii) how much predictive information the activity in that region adds over and 
above other activity used to construct the predictions. We use data from the whole 
brain to allow for the possibility that neural activity in some brain regions will prove 
informative after accounting for neural activity in other regions. This is particularly 
important, because the signal-to-noise of BOLD-fMRI in areas typically associated 
with valuation (like ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex) is relatively 
low. In fact, the accuracy of our method declines when we restrict attention solely to 
the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, indicating the value of our 
whole-brain approach. Third, many psychological processes exhibit some correla-
tion with value, such as attention and arousal. This implies that many voxels, besides 
those in areas known to be involved in valuation, will also correlate with values, and 
would have independent noise (Litt et al. 2011). These independent measurements 
are useful in prediction.
BOLD-fMRI operates by measuring changes in local magnetic fields resulting 
from local inflows of oxygenated hemoglobin and outflows of deoxygenated hemo-
globin that occur when neurons fire. The BOLD signal is correlated with aggregate 
neural activity within relatively small “neighborhoods” (tiny cubes, known as vox-
els). One complication is that BOLD responses are slower than the associated neu-
ronal responses: although the bulk of the neuronal response takes place in four to six 
seconds, subsequent BOLD measurements are affected for as much as 24 seconds. 
Even so, as long as trials are spaced sufficiently far apart, one can attribute most 
of the BOLD signal to trial-specific neural responses. In our experiment, each trial 
spanned a total of 11 seconds (2.75 seconds for an image, and 8.25 seconds for a 
fixation cross on a black screen), and BOLD measurements were obtained in 3-mm3 
voxels every 2.75 seconds. With this design, the BOLD signal provides a good mea-
sure of local neural responses to each image. This is an approximation, but it suffices 
for our purposes. Presumably, a sharper measure of neural activity would yield even 
greater predictive power than that of the somewhat noisy measure used here.
angle of 30 degrees relative to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line (Deichmann et al. 2003) and an 
8-channel phased array head coil to maximize functional contrast-to-noise in areas of the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex which, as described in Section II, have been shown to play a critical role in valuation. Each volume consisted 
of 44 axial slices covering the entire brain. The imaging parameters were: echo time, 30ms; field of view, 192mm; 
in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3mm; repetition time (TR), 2.75s.
13 For a review of the literature see Rangel and Hare (2010).
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stage 2: Pairwise choices.—In the second stage of the experiment, subjects were 
shown pairs of food items outside the scanner, and were asked to choose their pre-
ferred item from each pair. They were told that, with 50 percent probability, one of the 
pairs would be selected at random, and they would receive their choice from that pair.
The first ten subjects were shown 200 pairs of items drawn randomly with replace-
ment from the 100 foods viewed in stage 1. The remaining 17 subjects were shown 
50 randomly selected pairs, with each item appearing in a single pair. As discussed 
below, the first procedure is not appropriate for some portions of our analysis (a fact 
which we did not realize until we examined some preliminary results). Accordingly, 
some of the results reported below are based on all 27 subjects, while others are 
based on the last 17.
Foods were randomly assigned to left and right positions on the screen. As is com-
mon in such tasks, there was a small spatial bias: subjects chose the left item 53 per-
cent of the time ( p < 0.05, binomial test). When estimating our forecasting models, 
it is important to ensure that our predictions do not benefit artificially from this bias 
(as they would if we used models describing the probability of choosing the object 
displayed on the left). Accordingly, for every subject, we randomly divided the choice 
pairs into two equal sets: in one, the chosen item was designated as the “target,” while 
in the other the item not chosen was so designated. The choice for any trial was then 
coded as a 1 if the target item was chosen, and as a 0 otherwise. With this assignment, 
the unconditional probability that our discrete choice variable equals 1 in any given 
trial is exactly 50 percent, and the predictive success of more elaborate models must 
be judged against that neutral benchmark (rather than 53 percent).14
stage 3: Preference ratings.—In the final stage of the experiment, subjects were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they liked each food item, using a discrete scale 
from −3 (strongly dislike) to 3 (strongly like). They viewed pictures of all 100 items 
sequentially and entered liking ratings through button presses, proceeding at their 
own pace. They were told that their ratings would not affect the item they received 
at the end of stage 3, but they were also strongly encouraged to provide ratings that 
reflected their true preferences.
After each subject finished rating the items, we tossed a coin to determine whether 
he or she would receive an item chosen at random, or the item chosen in a randomly 
selected choice trial from stage 2 (where the item or choice trial was selected by 
drawing a number from an envelope). Subjects were required to eat at least three 
spoonfuls of the selected item, and were allowed to eat more if desired. Subjects 
were instructed to remain in the lab for 30 minutes, during which time they were not 
permitted to eat anything else.
14 Note that because the target item is designated at random, spatial bias effectively introduces random variation 
into the discrete choice variable that is inherently not predictable from stage 1 measurements. Thus, spatial bias 
necessarily reduces the predictive accuracy of our models.
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B. initial Data Processing
Before analyzing the predictive power of nonchoice BOLD responses, the raw 
data must be converted into a usable form. First, we corrected for head motion 
to ensure that the time series of BOLD measurements recorded at a specific spa-
tial location within the scanner is always associated with the same brain location 
throughout the experiment.15 Second, we removed low-frequency signals that are 
unlikely to be associated with neuronal responses to individual trials.16 Third, we 
realigned the BOLD responses for each individual into a common neuroanatomi-
cal frame (the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template). This step, 
called spatial normalization, is necessary because brains come in different shapes 
and sizes, and as a result a given spatial location maps to different brain regions in 
different subjects. Spatial normalization involves a nonlinear reshaping of the brain 
to maximize the match with a target template. Although the transformed data are not 
perfectly aligned across subjects due to remaining neuroanatomical heterogeneity, 
the process suffices for the purposes of this study. Any imperfections in the realign-
ment process introduce noise that reduces our ability to predict choices.
For the analyses described in Section IV (which involve comparisons across sub-
jects), we also spatially smoothed the BOLD data for each subject, by making BOLD 
responses for each voxel a weighted sum of the responses in neighboring voxels, with 
the weights decreasing with distance.17 This transformation addresses residual prob-
lems arising from neuroanatomical heterogeneity across subjects. In effect, smoothing 
assumes that any particular voxel in one subject’s brain can play the same predictive 
role as neighboring voxels in another subject’s brain; without smoothing, we would be 
assuming that only the same voxel can play the same predictive role.
The final step was to compute, for each subject and each voxel, the average 
 nonchoice neural response to each food item. We began by removing predicted neu-
ral responses that were related to the task (e.g., seeing the image of a food item) 
but common to all items.18 The object of this step is to restrict attention to BOLD 
responses that are specific to individual food items, and therefore likely to be help-
ful in predicting choices. Second, we averaged the residual response over the three 
presentations of each food item, collected 2.75 and 5.5 seconds after the onset of 
stimulus. In constructing this average, we omitted measurements from full brain 
scans (known as volumes) that exhibited excessive within-volume variation across 
15 BOLD measurements were corrected for head motion by aligning them to the first full brain scan and normal-
izing to the Montreal Neurological Institute’s EPI template. This entails estimating a six-parameter model of the 
head motion (three parameters for center movement, and three parameters for rotation) for each volume, and then 
removing the motion using these parameters. For details, see Friston et al. (1995).
16 Specifically, we applied a high-pass temporal filter to the BOLD data with a cutoff of 128 seconds.
17 Smoothing was performed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
18 We carried out this step by estimating a general linear model (GLM) of BOLD responses with an AR(1) 
structure. The model included the following regressors: an indicator function for the moment at which the image of 
an item appears on the screen, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic responses function (Friston et al. 1998) 
that captures the manner in which neural responses are mapped to delayed changes in the BOLD signal, six block 
dummies, and the time series of head motion parameters estimated in the preprocessing step described above. The 
residuals from this regression capture the BOLD responses from each trial that are item-specific. For reasons of 
practicality, we performed this calculation only for gray-matter voxels (of which there are approximately 45,000 
per subject). We identified gray matter in each subject using the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) tool and 
the MNI gray-matter mask (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002).
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voxels.19 This exclusion criterion reduces noise (and thereby improves predictive 
accuracy) by eliminating signals that are outliers with respect to the typical range of 
BOLD responses for food items.
III. Predicting Choices Involving New Items, within Subjects and Groups
The canonical task motivating our investigation is to determine how people 
will behave when confronted with some new or difficult-to-observe choice situa-
tions. Imagine assembling a group of individuals, measuring their nonchoice neural 
responses to prospects that we can actually implement, as well as to the new choice 
situations, and then presenting them with unanticipated choices among the imple-
mentable prospects. We can then estimate the relationship between their choices 
and nonchoice responses for the implementable prospects, and use that relationship 
along with nonchoice neural responses for the new situations to predict behavior in 
those situations. Do the nonchoice neural responses contain enough information to 
make reasonably accurate predictions?
In this section, we implement the procedure outlined in the previous paragraph 
and use it to make and evaluate predictions both within subjects and within groups.
A. Within-subject Predictions
In this subsection, we focus on the accuracy of within-subject predictions. For 
reasons detailed below, we restrict attention to subjects 11 through 27, each of whom 
made decisions for 50 pairs of food items, with no item appearing twice.
statistical Methods.— We adopt a logit probability model for choices. For every 
subject i and choice pair t, let  y it = 1 if the target food was chosen, and  y it = 0 other-
wise.20 For every subject i, choice pair t, and brain voxel v, let  d itv denote the differ-
ence between the measured neural responses in voxel v to the target and nontarget 
food items offered in choice pair t (i.e., the response for the target food minus the 
response for the nontarget food). Also let  D it denote the vector of differential neural 
responses for all voxels. The following probability statement describes our model:
(1) Pr  [ y it = 1 |  D it ] =  exp  ( γ 0 + γ ′  D it )   __ 
1 + exp  ( γ 0 + γ ′  D it )  .
Because our object is accurate out-of-sample prediction, we employ standard 
methods for estimating and evaluating predictive models. A central tenet of the pre-
diction literature is that within-sample fit is a poor gauge of out-of-sample fit (cf. 
Efron 1986). Therefore, we employ cross validation (Stone 1974) for both model 
assessment and model selection. Typically, one proceeds by dividing the sample 
19 For each volume we computed the variance across voxels (known as global signal variation), as well as the 
mean and standard deviation of this variance across volumes. We excluded data on volumes for which the global 
signal variation exceeded the median plus five mean absolute deviations.
20 As described in the previous section, one item in every pair was randomly designated as the target.
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into a “training sample” which is used for estimation, and a “hold-out” sample that 
is used to evaluate predictions. By removing two choice pairs at a time from the set 
of 50, we create 25 training samples (each consisting of 48 observations) and 25 
associated hold-out samples (each consisting of two observations). For each training 
sample, we estimate the model and use it to predict choices for the associated hold-
out observations. We then assess the model’s out-of-sample predictive performance 
over all 25 hold-out samples (50 predictions in all).
To ensure the representativeness of both the training and hold-out samples, we 
randomly partitioned the 50 choices into 25 pairs, with each pair containing one 
choice from which the target item was chosen, and another from which it was not 
chosen. Each such pair served as a hold-out sample, and the complement served 
as a training sample. This procedure, known as stratified cross validation, yields 
training and hold-out samples in which the target item is chosen exactly 50 per-
cent of the time, just as in the full sample (by construction). Leave-one-out cross 
validation is an approximately unbiased method for estimating the true (expected) 
prediction error (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009, 242). However, leave-
one-out cross validation estimators may have high variance, and simulation stud-
ies have concluded that stratified cross validation has better performance in terms 
of both bias and variance than regular cross validation (Kohavi 1995). Because 
our samples are unbalanced with leave-one-out cross validation, we compromise 
and employ stratified leave-two-out cross validation.
As the literature recognizes, evaluating the predictive performance of a categori-
cal probability model involves some inherent ambiguities. Alternative standards for 
defining a “predicted outcome” have been proposed. In the context of binary mod-
els, Cramer (1999) proposes identifying an alternative as the predicted outcome 
if its predicted probability exceeds its baseline frequency in the population.21 By 
construction, in our experiment, the baseline frequency for selecting the target item 
is exactly 50 percent for each subject. Consequently, we classify the target item as 
the predicted choice if its predicted probability exceeds 50 percent; otherwise, the 
nontarget item is the predicted choice. We classify a particular prediction as a “suc-
cess” if the predicted item was in fact chosen.
Notice that our task involves prediction from small samples (48 observations). 
It therefore raises two important and closely related issues: model selection 
and overfitting.
The model selection problem is obvious: because we estimate each model using 
only 48 observations, we cannot use all 45,000 potential predictors ( voxel-specific 
BOLD signals).22 Instead we must focus on a small handful of predictors, in effect 
leaving out large numbers of presumably relevant variables. If we intended to inter-
pret estimated parameters as reflecting causal effects, the left-out variable prob-
lem would be fatal. Accordingly, it is essential to emphasize that our objective 
here is purely prediction. When predicting from a small sample, it is worthwhile 
21 Even that alternative is recognized as somewhat arbitrary; see Greene (2003, 685).
22 See Chapter 18 of Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2009) for an overview of statistical techniques for pre-
diction problems when the predictors greatly outnumber the observations. Within the economics literature, see also 
Fan, Lv, and Qi (2011), and Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2011).
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to include a variable only if the incremental predictive information it carries is suf-
ficient to justify sacrificing a scarce degree of freedom. Thus, for example, when 
two important causal factors are highly correlated, it is often appropriate to include 
only one, because each reflects most of the predictive information contained in the 
other. Naturally, with either factor omitted, the coefficient of the included factor will 
not measure its causal effect; on the contrary, that coefficient will also reflect the 
causal effect of the omitted factor. Even so, the omission of a causal factor does not 
impart a bias to predictions (conditional on the included predictors), and may well 
reduce variance. Statistical tools for model selection include the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), cross-validated predic-
tive performance, LASSO (which we describe and implement below), and others.
The overfitting problem arises because, with small samples (and especially with 
many predictors), there is a substantial likelihood that some predictor will be highly 
correlated (within sample) with the outcome variable purely by chance. While OLS 
estimates will still yield statistically unbiased predictions, the variance of the pre-
diction error can be extremely high, and hence predictions can prove inaccurate. 
The most obvious case occurs when the number of predictors equals the number of 
observations. In our analysis, any combination of 48 linearly independent predictors 
will yield a perfect fit within sample, but the resulting model will generally perform 
very poorly out of sample.
Various techniques have been developed to address the overfitting problem. 
shrinkage estimators (of which ridge regression is the best known example) com-
pensate for overfitting by shrinking the overall size of the estimated coefficient vec-
tor. Such estimators can attenuate the sensitivity of predictions to changes in the 
predictors, and hence reduce variance, thereby improving the overall accuracy of 
out-of-sample predictive performance according to measures such as mean-squared 
prediction error (a commonly used statistic that encompasses both the bias and the 
precision of a prediction). We address the model selection and overfitting issues 
using LASSO (the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator; see Tibshirani 
1996) combined with cross validation. As the name implies, LASSO, like ridge 
regression, is a shrinkage procedure.23 For both procedures, one optimizes a stan-
dard criterion for within-sample fit (for example, minimizing the sum of squared 
residuals in the case of a regression, or maximizing likelihood) subject to a penalty 
that increases monotonically in the size of the coefficient vector. For ridge regres-
sion, one measures the size of the coefficient vector using the L 2-norm (i.e., the 
square root of the sum of squared coefficients). For LASSO, one uses the L1-norm (i.e., the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients). While both methods of 
penalization lead to shrinkage, only LASSO also accomplishes variable selection.24
23 In a linear regression context, one can also interpret LASSO as a Bayesian regression with double exponential 
priors; see Tibshirani (1996). In the Bayesian context, shrinkage results from the priors.
24 Relative to an  L 2 -penalty, an  L 1 -penalty favors coefficient vectors wherein some elements equal zero. Notice, 
for example, that in a model with two coefficients,  γ 1 and  γ 2 , as we move linearly from ( γ 1 ,  γ 2 ) = (α, 0) to ( γ 1 ,  γ 2 ) = (α/2, α/2), the  L 1 -penalty remains constant while the  L 2 -penalty declines monotonically. More importantly, 
because iso-penalty curves are smooth when one uses the  L 2 -norm, solutions involve coefficients of zero only by 
coincidence. In contrast, because iso-penalty curves are kinked at the axes when one uses the  L 1 -norm, solutions 
typically involve setting many coefficients equal to zero.
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In our context, the LASSO procedure involves maximizing the following penal-
ized log-likelihood function over the parameters  γ 0 and γ =  ( γ 1 , … ,  γ  v i ) , where  v i 
is the number of voxels for subject i:
(2)  1 _ 
T
 ∑ 
t=1
T
  {  y it log  p it +  ( 1 −  y it ) log  ( 1 −  p it ) } − λ ‖ γ ‖ 1 .
Here, T denotes the number of trials in the training set,  p it = Pr [ y it = 1 | D it ] and 
 ‖ γ ‖ 1 denotes the  L 1 norm on γ.25 In the LASSO objective function the  L 1 penalty 
receives a weight of λ.26 Larger values of λ lead to greater shrinkage and to more 
aggressive variable selection. The value of λ is determined through  cross validation, 
which is a procedure for simulating out-of-sample predictive performance entirely 
within a training sample. For our analysis, we randomly divided each training sample 
into five sets of approximately equal size, indexed k = 1, … , 5 (called folds in the sta-
tistical prediction and machine learning literatures). For each k, we estimated the penal-
ized regression model for each possible value of λ in a prespecified grid using only the 
data from the k − 1 other folds. We then used the estimated models to predict choices 
for the left-out fold, and computed the accuracy of the predictions by comparing them 
to the actual choices. The value of λ with the highest successful prediction rate across 
all of the folds,  λ ∗ , was then used to estimate the model with all of the observations in 
the training sample.27 Importantly, note that the selection of  λ ∗ is blind with respect to 
outcomes in the actual hold-out sample; thus, accuracy within the  hold-out samples 
remains a valid gauge of the procedure’s out-of-sample performance.
The LASSO procedure not only achieves beneficial shrinkage, but also in effect 
ensures that a variable remains in the model with a nonzero coefficient only if 
its incremental predictive value is sufficient to justify the sacrifice of a degree 
of freedom. Thus, in our setting the procedure selects the brain voxels with the 
neural responses that provide the most valuable predictive informative concerning 
subsequent choices.
Prior to implementing the LASSO procedure, we reduced the vast set of can-
didate voxels by excluding those that failed to meet a simple statistical criterion. 
Ryali et al. (2010) have shown that this initial screening step can improve predic-
tive accuracy in studies employing fMRI data, even when the subsequent estima-
tion procedure selects voxels automatically (as is the case here). For every voxel, 
we computed a simple two-sided t-test for the hypothesis of no difference between 
neural responses (within the training sample) to foods that were chosen and those 
that were not. We then ranked voxels by the absolute values of their t-statistics, and 
retained only those exceeding some threshold percentile.28 Intuitively, the purpose 
of this initial screening step is to focus attention on voxels that are likely to contain 
highly predictive information. For each prediction task, we examine the robustness 
of prediction success rates with respect to a range of screening criteria, and then 
25 Note that the probabilities  p it depend on  γ 0 , but that this term is not penalized in the LASSO specification.
26 To fit the model we used the glmnet software package for MATLAB (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani 2010).
27 We use the out-of sample prediction (success) rate here and throughout this paper as our criteria for selecting  λ ∗ , 
in order to maximize predictive success. An alternative criterion is log-likelihood.
28 According to Ryali et al. (2010), this screening step can improve predictive performance in these settings.
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present more detailed results based on analyses for which the top 1 percent of vox-
els were retained. Note that the voxel selection procedure, like the selection of  λ ∗ , 
is completely blind with respect to outcomes in the actual hold-out sample; thus, 
accuracy within the hold-out samples remains a valid gauge of the procedure’s 
out-of-sample performance.
As we mentioned at the outset of this section, data gathered from our first ten sub-
jects were not used for within-subject predictions. Recall that those subjects made 
choices from 200 pairs of items, drawn randomly with replacement from our set of 
100 items. Thus, when the full sample is divided into a training sample and a hold-out 
sample, the items that belong to pairs in the hold-out sample also typically belong to 
pairs in the training sample. The resulting overlap between the sets of items repre-
sented in the training and hold-out samples can lead to spurious predictive accuracy.29
results.—Figure 1 plots the mean success rates, defined as the fraction of  hold-out 
observations for which the predicted item was chosen, as a function of the percent 
of voxels retained after initial screening, with the retained percentiles ranging from 
0.01 percent to 100 percent. When 1 percent of voxels are retained, the mean success 
rate is 61.3 percent, which represents an economically and statistically significant 
improvement over the uninformed 50 percent benchmark ( p < 0.0001, one-sided 
t-test). Performance falls sharply when fewer than 1 percent of voxels are retained, 
but declines only slightly when fewer are eliminated. Indeed, when we abandon the 
initial screening step (i.e., retain all voxels), our overall success rate, 59.3 percent, 
remains significantly better than the uninformed benchmark ( p < 0.001), and is 
not significantly different from the rate obtained when retaining 1 percent of voxels 
( p = 0.23, paired t-test). Thus we find, in contrast to Ryali et al. (2010), that the ini-
tial voxel-screening step yields only a small and statistically insignificant improve-
ment in this measure of predictive accuracy. For the rest of this section, we will 
focus on the results obtained using the 1 percent screening criterion; our conclusions 
are not substantially affected by applying less restrictive screens.
The first data column in Table 1 provides results on success rates for each sub-
ject (numbered 11 through 27 because this analysis excludes the first ten subjects). 
There was considerable cross-subject variation in success rates, which ranged from 
a low of 44 percent to a high of 76 percent, with all but one exceeding 50 percent 
and four exceeding 70 percent. These rates exceeded the uninformed benchmark 
29  To see why, suppose for the purpose of illustration that the subject’s choices are pair-wise transitive. From the 
choices in the training sample, one can then predict many choices perfectly out of sample. For example, if the indi-
vidual chooses a over b as well as b over c in the training sample, we can confidently predict that he will pick a over 
c out of sample; no neural information is required. This observation is problematic because, with 45,000 voxels, 
there is a substantial likelihood that each item will be associated with some voxel within which neural activity was 
high when the item in question, and only that item, was presented. That voxel serves as a spurious neural identifier 
for the item. LASSO tends to retain those voxels and assign them coefficients that reflect each item’s place in the 
subject’s preference ordering. In our example, it might assign coefficients of 1, 0, and −1 to the voxels identify-
ing, respectively, items a, b, and c. Accordingly, the resulting model will predict that a will be chosen over c out of 
sample, but only because the neural activity spuriously identifies the item, and not because it is correlated with some 
provisional assessment of subjective value. We discovered this problem after collecting data on the first ten subjects 
and obtaining results indicating a degree of predictive accuracy that seemed too good to be true (i.e., well in excess 
of 80 percent). Subsequently, we avoided the problem by selecting the choice pairs for subjects 11 through 27 so 
that each item appeared in one and only one pair. We include the data gathered from the first ten subjects only in the 
analyses of Sections IIIB and IV, where the problem does not arise.
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Figure 1. Overall Success Rate as a Function of the Percent of Voxels Retained 
after Initial Screening when Predicting Choices for New Items
note: The between group standard errors are bootstrapped using the 200 population draws.
Table 1—Predictive Accuracy for Choices Involving New Items, within Subject
Predicted probability of the 
more likely item LPM
Subject Success rate Mean SD p-value for bias Slope SE of slope
11 0.66*** 0.663 0.138 0.966 0.966 0.485
12 0.52 0.702 0.156 0.013** 0.550 0.459
13 0.62** 0.728 0.143 0.090* 1.579 0.434
14 0.66*** 0.768 0.133 0.126 0.133 0.517
15 0.58 0.711 0.128 0.074* 0.230 0.559
16 0.52 0.742 0.147 0.005*** −0.075 0.494
17 0.58 0.730 0.136 0.050* −0.325 0.527
18 0.76*** 0.738 0.141 0.726 0.393 0.437
19 0.54 0.733 0.142 0.014** −0.332 0.508
20 0.58 0.692 0.148 0.114 0.698 0.476
21 0.62** 0.748 0.140 0.070* 0.517 0.499
22 0.72*** 0.697 0.130 0.727 0.381 0.501
23 0.68*** 0.717 0.144 0.567 0.955 0.454
24 0.70*** 0.763 0.118 0.320 1.328 0.544
25 0.44 0.760 0.145 0.000*** −0.420 0.494
26 0.52 0.733 0.141 0.007*** −0.312 0.515
27 0.72*** 0.738 0.155 0.761 1.114 0.392
Group mean 0.613*** 0.727 0.140 < 0.001*** 0.434 0.488
SD 0.089 0.028 0.010 0.615 0.043
notes: Based on an initial voxel selection threshold of 0.01. Asterisks are used to denote statistical significance 
only in the columns for “success rate” (difference from uninformed benchmark of 0.50, binomial test for individual 
rates, 1-sided t-test for group mean rate) and “p-value for bias” (difference between success rate and mean predicted 
probability, two-sided t-test). “Success rate” is the frequency with which the item with highest predicted choice 
probability in each pair was actually chosen; “p-value for bias” refers to the test statistic for the hypothesis that the 
success rate equals the mean predicted probability, and “LPM” refers to a simple linear probability model relating a 
success indicator to the predicted probability. “Group mean” is the mean of within-subject means, and “SD” is the 
standard deviation of within-subject means.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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by a  statistically significant margin for nine out of 17 subjects at the 5 percent level 
(amongst whom the overall success rate was 68 percent), and for eight out of 17 sub-
jects at the 1 percent level. Plainly, nonchoice neural responses contain a substantial 
amount of predictive information for those subjects. For subsequent reference, we 
have shaded all of the rows in the table associated with high-success-rate subjects 
(i.e., those whose success rates exceeded the uninformed benchmark by statisti-
cally significant margins), so that their results are easily distinguished from those of 
low-success-rate subjects (i.e., the complementary set).
As we mentioned in the introduction, a success rate is a particular blend of the 
resolution and calibration of a probabilistic prediction.30 Resolution refers to the 
degree of certainty. The statement that an individual will choose the target item with 
either 1 percent or 99 percent probability involves high resolution, while the state-
ment that he will choose that item with either 49 percent or 51 percent probability 
involves low resolution. Calibration refers to the degree to which the probabilistic 
prediction matches actual frequencies. To illustrate, suppose that for some group 
of pairwise choices, a model predicts that the target will be chosen with an average 
probability of 75 percent. The model’s predictions are well calibrated if the realized 
frequency that the target is chosen, for any reasonably large group of observations, 
is close to the average predicted probability. If it is not close, the model’s predic-
tions are poorly calibrated. In the preceding example, if the realized frequency is 
55 percent rather than 75 percent, the model’s probabilistic predictions are poorly 
calibrated. The same is true if the frequency is 95 percent.
According to these definitions, the predictions of the uninformed benchmark 
(50–50) have zero resolution but are perfectly calibrated (because the overall success 
rate, 50 percent, matches the predicted probability of the most likely item in every pair). 
In contrast, the typical deterministic model will be highly resolved, but in all likelihood 
poorly calibrated (because it is rarely possible to forecast outcomes with certainty).
Knowing only that the average success rate for our procedure is 61.3 percent, one 
cannot say anything about the resolution or calibration of the underlying predictions. 
Yet such distinctions are plainly crucial. If our procedure typically yielded predicted 
probabilities of the more likely item on the order of 90 percent but achieved an overall 
success rate near 60 percent, its success would be only directional, and one would not 
be able to take its probabilistic predictions seriously. On the other hand, if on average 
our procedure yielded predicted probabilities of the more likely item near 60 percent 
(i.e., in line with the observed success rate), then although one could complain that its 
predictions had somewhat low resolution, at least they would be well calibrated.31
With respect to potential complaints concerning low resolution, it bears empha-
sizing that the value of an accurate predictive model should not be discounted 
merely because its predictions are not as highly resolved as one might like. On the 
individual level, certain determinants of choice may be fundamentally unpredict-
able (see, e.g., Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel 2010), in which case the resolution of 
any well-calibrated probabilistic prediction is necessarily limited. Fortunately, such 
30 These terms refer to a decomposition of the mean squared forecast error or Brier score (Brier 1950). Our 
discussion follows Murphy’s (1973) decomposition; see also Yates (1982), and Murphy and Winkler (1987).
31 As explained below, further investigation would be required before reaching that conclusion.
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idiosyncratic randomness likely averages out over multiple decisions, so it should 
still be possible to predict the average behavior of groups with reasonably high reso-
lution (see Sections IIIB and IV).
The second data column in Table 1 sheds light on the resolution of our proce-
dure’s predictions. Focusing for the moment on the second-to-last row, we see that 
the mean predicted probability of the more likely item is 72.7 percent. For a per-
fectly calibrated model, this number equals the expected success rate. Yet we see 
that there is a sizable and highly statistically significant gap (or bias) of 11.4 per-
centage points between the mean predicted probability and the overall success rate 
of 61.3 percent ( p < 0.001). At this level of aggregation, one cannot describe the 
models’ probabilistic predictions as well calibrated.
A careful examination of the results for individual subjects tells a more interest-
ing and nuanced story. Based on our initial analysis of success rates for individual 
subjects, it is entirely possible that our procedure works well for some subjects, and 
poorly (or not at all) for others. For example, some subjects may not meaningfully 
attend to the images of food items during stage 1.32
To evaluate the calibration of the predictive model for each subject, we first test 
the hypothesis that the success rate equals the mean predicted probability of the 
more likely item. The fourth column of Table 1 contains the p-values for those 
subject-specific tests. Comparing the shaded and unshaded lines, we see a striking 
pattern. We cannot reject equality of the success rate and the expected success rate 
with 95 percent confidence for any of the high-success-rate subjects, and we reject 
equality with 90 percent confidence for only two of these subjects (and would have 
expected roughly one rejection by chance). In contrast, we reject equality at the 
90 percent confidence level for seven of the eight low-success-rate subjects (and 
with 88 percent confidence for the eighth), at the 95 percent confidence level for 
five, and at the 99 percent confidence level for three. Visually, asterisks (indicating 
levels of statistical significance) tend to appear in the first data column when no 
asterisks appear in the fourth, and vice versa.
Overall, for high-success-rate subjects, the mean success rate is 68.2 percent, 
while the expected success rate is 72.9 percent; the difference (or bias) is modest 
but statistically significant ( p = 0.042). Though the predictions are not right on the 
mark, they are remarkably close given the nature of our out-of-sample prediction 
exercise. Interestingly, our predictions are equally resolved for the low-success-rate 
subjects: the expected success rate is 72.6 percent. However, the mean success rate 
for those subjects is only 53.5 percent, and the difference (or bias) is large and 
highly statistically significant ( p < 0.001).
One might be tempted to discount the preceding results as a possible coincidence: 
if the overall success rate is below the overall mean predicted probability, and if the 
latter does not vary between low- and high-success-rate subjects, then it is not sur-
prising that the success rate for high-success-rate subjects is closer to that group’s 
32 Additional sources of subject-level variation in predictive success might include: local temperature variation 
during scanning, variability in the functioning of the imaging hardware, physiological noise (such as heart-rate vari-
ability), or subject motion. See Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2009, chapter 8), for a discussion of noise sources 
in fMRI. We remove these factors when possible, but some (e.g., thermal and scanner-related noise) are difficult to 
measure and therefore to control.
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mean predicted probability of the more likely item. Thus, we view this first test as 
providing only a relatively weak preliminary indication concerning the model’s per-
formance among high-success-rate subjects.
Fortunately, a more demanding test is available. So far, we have made no use of 
variation in the strength of predictions across hold-out observations (e.g., whether 
the predicted probability of choosing the target item is 51 percent or 98 percent). 
According to Table 1, the mean within-subject standard deviation of the predicted 
probability is substantial (0.140). Moreover, the predicted probability of the more 
likely item is distributed fairly evenly between 50 percent and 100 percent (see 
Figure A2 in the online Appendix). Using this variation allows us to determine 
whether our predictive procedure is functioning properly. If, for example, the pre-
dicted probability averages 60 percent within one large group of hold-out observa-
tions and 80 percent within a second group, and if the model is generating valid 
out-of-sample probabilities, the frequency with which the more likely item is chosen 
should be approximately 60 percent in the first group and approximately 80 percent 
in the second. Even if the model is just capturing tendencies, that frequency should 
be noticeably higher in the second group than in the first.
We implement this idea as follows. First, we rank the hold-out observations 
(pooled across all subjects) according to the predicted probability of the more likely 
choice (i.e., the probability of choosing the target item if the model indicates that 
the target is more likely, and the probability of choosing the nontarget item if the 
model indicates that the nontarget item is more likely). Second, we divide the obser-
vations into deciles based on that probability. Third, for each decile, we compute 
the frequency with which the item identified as more likely was in fact chosen (i.e., 
the success frequency). Finally, we examine the relationship across deciles between 
the average predicted probability of choosing the more likely item and the actual 
frequency with which that item was actually chosen.33
Figure 2, panel A plots the results, pooled over all subjects. The horizontal axis 
shows the predicted probability of choosing the more likely item, while the vertical 
axis shows the frequency with which that item was actually chosen. For an ideal 
predictive model, the data points would line up along the 45-degree line (i.e., the 
predicted probabilities and the success frequencies would always coincide). Though 
our procedure does not achieve this ideal, there is nevertheless an obvious and rea-
sonably strong positive relationship between the predicted probabilities and success 
frequencies. Between the first and eighth deciles, the actual success rate increases 
roughly half a percentage point for every 1-percentage-point increase in the pre-
dicted probability; beyond the eighth decile, it declines modestly. Overall, the pre-
dictive performance of the model is encouraging, at least directionally.
Figure 2, panel B performs the same analysis separately for low- and 
 high- success-rate subjects. The results are striking. For the eight low-success-rate 
 subjects, there is no relationship between success frequencies and predicted 
probabilities: the line moves up and down a bit, but overall is fairly flat. With 
these problematic subjects removed, the procedure’s performance is much 
33 This procedure is motivated by and closely related to a goodness-of-fit test for binary choice models described 
by Lemeshow and Hosmer (1982).
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note: Panel A: the entire group; panel B: high-success-rate and  low-success-rate subjects.
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improved. For the nine  high-success-rate subjects, the relationship between suc-
cess frequencies and predicted probabilities increases more sharply than the one 
in Figure 2, panel A, and is much closer to the ideal (i.e., the 45-degree line). 
For the lowest two deciles, within which the average predicted probability is 
53.8 percent, the overall success frequency is 56.7 percent, while for the highest 
two deciles, within which the average predicted probability is 92.7 percent, the 
overall success frequency is 84.4 percent.
To sharpen these impressions, we conduct additional statistical analyses. For each 
subject i and choice trial t, we define a binary success indicator,  s it , which equals 
unity when the subject chooses the item predicted as more likely (with this trial 
treated as a hold-out observation), and zero otherwise. Let  P it denote the predicted 
probability that the subject i will choose the item identified as more likely in choice 
trial t (again, when this choice trial is treated as a hold-out observation). Assuming 
that  P it is in fact a correct probability, it follows trivially that E[ s it |  P it ] =  P it . Thus, 
s it =  P it +  ε it , where E[ ε it |  P it ] = 0 (in particular,  ε it equals 1 −  P it with probabil-
ity  P it , and − P it with probability 1 −  P it ). Accordingly, our strategy is to estimate 
simple linear probability models (LPMs) of the following form:
(3)  s it = α + β  P it +  ε it .
If the predicted probability statements are in fact correct, we should obtain α = 0 
and β = 1.
We estimate two versions of the preceding linear probability models, one for 
the nine high-success-rate subjects, and one for the eight low-success-rate  subjects. 
We use weighted least squares to account for the inherent  heteroskedasticity in 
the linear probability models, following the procedure in Wooldridge (2003, 
455). In these regressions, each observation consists of a single hold-out choice 
pair; thus, the regression for high-success-rate subjects uses 50 × 9 = 450 obser-
vations, while the regression for low-success-rate subjects uses 50 × 8 = 400 
observations. For the eight low-success-rate subjects, we obtain an intercept of 
0.551 (s.e. = 0.129) and a slope of −0.023 (s.e. = 0.174). The combination of low 
success rates and the absence of any detectable relationship between the two vari-
ables indicates that our forecasting procedure fails for those subjects. In contrast, for 
the nine  high-success-rate subjects, we obtain an intercept to 0.118 (s.e. = 0.113) 
and a slope 0.775 (s.e. = 0.152). Here, the relationship between the two variables 
is strong, positive, highly statistically significant, and within the general vicinity of 
the ideal. However, we reject the hypothesis that the intercept is in fact zero and the 
slope unity ( p = 0.012). With that qualification, our prediction model performs well 
out of sample for the nine high-success-rate subjects.
Conceivably, the strong results obtained for the LPM estimated with 
 high-success-rate subjects could be attributable to compositional effects: success 
rates might be unrelated to predicted probabilities within subject, but subjects 
with higher success rates might also have higher predicted probabilities. In prac-
tice, Table 1 provides little reason to anticipate significant compositional effects, 
because the means and standard deviations of the predicted probabilities (the second 
and third data columns) are quite similar across subjects (the cross-subject standard 
VoL. 6 no. 2 23SMITH ET AL.: NEURAL ACTIVITY REVEALS PREFERENCES WITHOUT CHOICES
deviations of these statistics are only 0.028 in the case of the within-subject mean, 
and 0.010 in the case of the within-subject standard deviation).
To rule out the possibility that our LPM results for high-success-rate subjects 
reflect compositional effects, we estimate another LPM with subject-fixed effects. 
Our estimate of β increases to 0.808 (s.e. = 0.157). We also estimate an LPM sepa-
rately for every subject. The slope coefficients and associated standard errors are 
reported in the last two data columns of Table 1. Because each regression employs 
only 50 observations, the standard errors are large. Still, the overall pattern is strik-
ing. For the high-success-rate subjects, the slopes are all positive and range from a 
low of 0.133 to a high of 1.579. The mean slope is 0.818 and the median is 0.955, 
with three of the nine slopes exceeding unity. In contrast, for the low-success-rate 
subjects, five of the eight slopes are negative. They range from a low of −0.420 to a 
high of 0.698, with a mean of −0.002 and a median of −0.194.
We conclude that our within-subject procedure for predicting choices involv-
ing new items performs successfully for roughly half (nine of seventeen) of our 
subjects. The overall success rate is 68 percent for that group, and subject-specific 
success rates are close to subject-specific mean predicted probabilities of the more 
likely item, our expected success rates. Moreover, success frequencies mirror pre-
dicted probabilities across hold-out observations, both overall and within subjects. 
The predicted probabilities are not always spot-on for this group, but they are close.
We acknowledge that the procedure works poorly for the rest of our subjects: the 
overall success rate is only 54 percent, subject-specific success rates differ consid-
erably from subject-specific mean predicted probabilities, and success frequencies 
bear no discernable relation to predicted probabilities across hold-out observations.34
B. Within-Group Predictions
Our investigation in this subsection parallels that of Section IVA, except that we 
study average behavior among groups, rather than the choices of specific individu-
als. Our objective is determine whether the average neural responses among a group 
of individuals contain enough information to make reasonably accurate predictions 
concerning the group’s average behavior in new situations, using a model estimated 
with data concerning the same group.
34 An obvious question is whether there are any systematic and predictable differences between the subjects for 
whom the procedure works well and those for whom it works poorly. Although the experiment was not designed 
to address this question, we carried out the following three post-hoc exercises. First, we hypothesized that more 
attentive subjects might have higher success rates. However, we find no relationship between success rates and 
a subject’s mean response time (RT) on catch trials, which is a proxy for attentiveness (Spearman’s ρ −0.15, 
p = 0.56 for a test of the hypothesis of no correlation). Second, we hypothesized that it might be more difficult to 
predict choices for subjects who had weaker preferences across foods. The variance in their reported ratings is a 
proxy for the strength of their preferences. However, we found no relationship between this variance and success 
rates (Spearman’s ρ −0.10, p = 0.70). Finally, since head motion is a well-known source of noise in fMRI studies, 
we investigated if this factor played a role. Standard fMRI preprocessing software computes six measures of head 
motion: shifts in the x, y, and z direction as well as the rotation measures pitch, roll, and yaw. Following common 
practice, we ignored rotation and dropped subjects whose head motion exceeded 2mm in any direction in any of 
the six scanner runs. Among the remaining subjects, we found no relationship between motion and success rates 
(Spearman’s ρ −0.04, p = 0.88).
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Here we predict measures of subjective valuation, averaged across group mem-
bers. A natural alternative strategy would have been to predict the fraction of sub-
jects choosing the target item from a given pair. Unfortunately, that alternative is 
inconsistent with our experimental design, which employed different random pair-
ings of the items for different subjects.
As explained in Section III, stage 3 of our experiment elicits preference ratings 
(on a scale of −3 to +3) for each item from every subject. We acknowledge that that 
our elicitation protocol is not incentive-compatible and that these ratings may not 
provide cardinally meaningful measures of WTP, but we study them nevertheless for 
two reasons. First, preference ratings were elicited after the subjects made incentiv-
ized choices, from which it follows that (i) subjects had already thought about their 
preferences for each item in an  incentive-compatible context, and (ii) subjects were 
likely to provide ratings that rationalized their choices. Second, these ratings were 
in fact highly correlated with choices: subjects choose the item with the highest rat-
ing 85.1 percent of the time in the 50-choice condition (subjects 1–10; p < 10–12, 
one-sided t-test versus chance) and 90.1 percent of the time in the 200-choice con-
dition (subjects 11–27: p < 10–8, one-sided t-test versus chance). Third, and more 
importantly, to the extent preference ratings are noisy measures of subjective valu-
ation, our results likely understate the true predictive power of nonchoice neural 
responses.
statistical Methods.—Before aggregating subjective ratings across our 27 sub-
jects, we normalized each subject’s ratings using a z-score transformation. We then 
computed the mean normalized ratings for the group, denoted  Z j for item j, as well 
as the group’s mean nonchoice neural responses, denoted  M j for item j, where  M j is 
a vector containing the average (across the group) neural response for each voxel v, 
denoted  M vj .
35
As a first step, we simply ask whether the average nonchoice neural responses to 
an item predict whether its average subjective rating is above or below the median 
rating (denoted  Z med ). This is an interesting comparison because it stands in for a 
binary choice between the item in question and the median-rated alternative. We 
assume that the probability of an above-median rating for any item j is given by the 
logistic function36
(4) Pr  ( Z j >  Z med |  M j ) =  exp ( γ 0 + γ ′  M j )  __ 
1 + exp ( γ 0 + γ ′  M j ) .
Plainly, realizations of this process cannot be independent across items (because 
half of the items must be above the median). However, with a sufficient number of 
items, correlations across observations are presumably small, so we ignore them and 
treat the model as a simple approximation of the true process.
35 See Figure A3 in the online Appendix for the distribution of mean normalized ratings across food items.
36 The probability of any item falling above the median clearly depends on the entire vector of neural responses 
to all items. However, in our analysis, that vector is identical for all items (because all items are part of the same 
group); consequently, we suppress it in the notation.
VoL. 6 no. 2 25SMITH ET AL.: NEURAL ACTIVITY REVEALS PREFERENCES WITHOUT CHOICES
By removing two items at a time from the set of 100, we create 50 training sam-
ples (each consisting of 98 observations) and 50 associated hold-out samples (each 
consisting of two observations). For each training sample, we then estimate the 
model and use it to predict whether the average valuations for the hold-out obser-
vations will fall above or below the median valuation of items within the training 
sample. We then assess the model’s out-of-sample predictive performance over all 
100 predictions. We classify a prediction as a success if the item’s average subjec-
tive rating falls into the half of the training sample rating distribution that the model 
identifies as more likely.
As in the previous section, we applied a screening criterion to reduce the number 
of candidate voxels prior to estimating the model for any given training sample. 
Using only the training data, for each voxel v we regressed  M vj on a binary variable 
indicating whether  Z j was above  Z 
med . We then ranked the voxels according to the 
absolute values of the t-statistics of the slope coefficients and retained those falling 
within some specified quantile. Then we estimated the probability model using the 
LASSO procedure, selecting the penalty parameter through five-fold  cross valida-
tion, where the folds were assigned at random.
The second step in our analysis of group behavior was to predict the actual value 
of  Z j , an item’s average subjective rating across all subjects, rather than a binary 
indicator of its position relative to the median. For this analysis, we employed a 
LASSO-penalized linear regression of  Z j on  M j . In the initial screening step, for 
each voxel v we regressed  M vj on  Z j , then ranked all voxels by the t-statistics of the 
slope coefficients, and retained the highest 1 percent. All other procedures were 
identical, except that the LASSO penalty parameter,  λ ∗ , was chosen to maximize 
 cross-validated mean-squared-error (which is appropriate here given that the objec-
tive is to predict a continuous variable).
As mentioned previously, the data gathered from our first ten subjects are suitable 
for this analysis. Only the stage 2 choice data for those subjects have the feature that a 
single item plays a role in more than one observation (which produces violations of the 
assumed separation between training and hold-out samples), and we do not use those 
data here. Thus, throughout this section we present results based on all 27 subjects.
results.—We begin with an analysis of predictions concerning the probability 
that the average subjective rating for a given hold-out item will fall above the median 
rating for items in the training sample. Figure 1 plots the overall success rate as a 
function of the percent of voxels retained after initial screening, with the retained 
percent ranging from 0.01 percent to 100 percent. Our procedure maximizes the 
success rate when 0.5 percent of voxels are retained. The overall success rate is then 
77 percent, which represents an economically and statistically significant improve-
ment over the uninformed 50 percent benchmark ( p < 0.001, one-sided t-test). 
Performance falls sharply when fewer than 0.5 percent of voxels are retained in the 
initial screening step, but is fairly robust when fewer are eliminated, with success 
rates generally exceeding 70 percent. Recalling that classifications of ratings  relative 
to the median stand in for binary choices between any given item and an alterna-
tive of median value, we note that we achieve a significantly higher overall success 
rate for within-group predictions than for the within-subject predictions discussed 
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in Sections IIIA (compare the pertinent lines in Figure 1). To avoid cherry-picking 
results  section-by-section, we adopt the same screening criterion here as in the pre-
vious section (1 percent), which yields a success rate of 73 percent, rather than the 
success-rate-maximizing 0.5 percent criterion. Our conclusions are not substantially 
affected by applying less restrictive screens.
Figure 3, panel A illustrates the relationship between the predicted probability of 
an above-median rating and an item’s average rating. Each data point corresponds to 
a food item; circles and crosses represent, respectively, correctly and incorrectly clas-
sified items. A strong positive relationship is easily discerned: our model plainly tends 
to predict higher probabilities of above-median ratings for more highly rated items.
As in Section IIIA, we perform an initial test of the validity of the model’s pre-
dictive probability statements by comparing the average predicted probability with 
the overall success rate. On average, the model predicts that items will fall into the 
more likely half of the rating distribution with 79 percent probability. This figure is 
close to the actual success rate (73 percent), and the gap is statistically insignificant 
( p = 0.388, two-sided t-test).
For a more discerning assessment of the model’s predictive validity, we grouped 
items into quintiles (20 items in each) based on the predicted probability that the 
item’s average rating exceeded the median, and then, for each quintile, computed 
the frequency with which the group’s ratings of those items actually fell above the 
median. Results appear in Figure 3, panel B. A strong positive relationship between 
predicted probabilities and realized frequencies is readily apparent. While the five 
data points do not line up along the 45-degree line, the empirical relation bears some 
resemblance to that ideal.
To sharpen this impression, we estimated a linear probability model (again 
using weighted least squares, to account for heteroskedasticity of the error term) 
relating a binary variable indicating whether an item’s average rating was above 
the median to the predicted probability of that event. The estimated intercept is 
0.173 (s.e. = 0.080), and the slope is 0.624 (s.e. = 0.127). We reject the joint 
hypothesis that the intercept is zero and the slope is unity with 95 percent confi-
dence ( p = 0.013). Although the point estimates may not support a literal interpre-
tation of the model’s predictive probability statements, on the whole its quantitative 
 out-of-sample performance is promising.
Next we turn to predictions of the average rating itself, rather than its rela-
tion to the median. Figure 4 plots average normalized ratings against predicted 
ratings. The predictions are by no means exact, but there is once again a strong 
positive relationship. To summarize that relation, we regress the actual rating 
on the predicted rating using ordinary least squares and plot the regression line. 
With unbiased predictions, our regression would yield an intercept of zero and 
a slope of unity. We obtain an intercept of −0.012 (s.e. = 0.060) and a slope of 
0.712 (s.e. = 0.144), and fail to reject the joint hypothesis of interest with 90 per-
cent confidence ( p = 0.136). The predicted ratings account for 20 percent of the 
variation in the actual ratings.
We conclude that our within-group procedure for predicting the average rat-
ings of new items performs with considerable success. For the binary prediction 
task, the overall success rate is well over 70 percent, considerably higher than for 
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Figure 3. Predicting Above-and-Below-Median Ratings for New Items within Groups
notes: Panel A: scatter plot of mean ratings versus predicted probability that item is in the upper 
half of the group’s valuation distribution. Circles denote correct predictions. Crosses denote 
incorrect predictions. Panel B: fraction of items with ratings exceeding the median versus aver-
age predicted probability of rating exceeding the median, grouped by quintiles of the latter.
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 within-subject predictions, and predicted probabilities match up reasonably well 
with realized frequencies. Predicted ratings also track average ratings and plainly 
contain usefully predictive information.
Conceivably, one might achieve greater predictive accuracy by conditioning on 
higher moments of the distribution of predicted ratings. Likewise, it may be possible 
to predict additional parameters of the distribution of actual ratings, such as vari-
ance. These are important questions, but we leave them for future research.
IV. Predicting Choices across Groups
The method of prediction developed and implemented in the previous section 
requires the use of separate forecasting models calibrated to each individual or 
group. If nonchoice neural activity exhibits a sufficiently similar relation to choice 
across subjects, then it should be possible to construct a single prediction model and 
use it without recalibration to predict choices based on neural measurements taken 
from new individuals or groups. Such a model would have considerable practical 
value in that, once estimated, it would vastly simplify the steps required to formulate 
additional predictions. In particular, to predict behavior in new situations, one could 
collect data on nonchoice neural responses to the relevant prospects for a new group 
of individuals, and apply the existing model. It would not be necessary to collect 
new measurements from the same set of individuals used to estimate the original 
model, or to reestimate the model with additional data elicited from the new group. 
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Indeed, with sufficient research, it might be possible to converge upon a single, 
stable formula for predicting new choices based on nonchoice neural responses.
In this section we explore the feasibility of developing a single model for pre-
dicting choices from nonchoice neural responses that is portable from one group 
to another. Specifically, we investigate whether it is possible to estimate the model 
with data on one group’s choice distributions over various sets of items and, with 
reasonable accuracy, use it to predict another group’s choice distributions over sets 
of new items.
statistical Methods.—The methods used here are identical to those of Section IIIB, 
with some exceptions involving the nature of the training and hold-out samples. As 
in Section IIIB, all twenty-seven subjects were included in this analysis. Here, we 
randomly divide the subjects into a training group of 14 subjects and a hold-out 
group of 13 subjects. By removing two items at a time from the set of 100, we create 
50 training sets (each consisting of 98 items) and 50 associated hold-out sets (each 
consisting of two items).
For each set of training items, we then estimate the same two models as in 
Section IIIB using data on the training subjects. We use one model to predict whether 
the average ratings of the hold-out subjects for the hold-out items will fall above or 
below the average rating of the median item for the hold-out subjects, and the other 
to predict the average ratings themselves.
To ensure that our results cannot be attributed to a potentially idiosyncratic division 
of the subjects, we repeat this exercise 200 times, selecting the training and  hold-out 
groups randomly each time. We thereby generate a total of 20,000 predictions.
results and Discussion.—We begin with an analysis of predictions concerning the 
probability that the hold-out group’s average subjective rating for a given hold-out item 
will fall above the median rating for items in the training data. Figure 1 plots the overall 
success rate (averaged over the 200 population draws) as a function of the percent of 
voxels retained after initial screening, with the retained percent ranging from 0.01 per-
cent to 100 percent of voxels. Our procedure maximizes this rate when 50 percent of 
voxels are retained. The average overall success rate is then 61.2 percent,37 which rep-
resents an economically and statistically significant improvement over the uninformed 
50 percent benchmark ( p < 0.001, one-sided t-test). Here, the initial voxel selection 
criterion has a fairly small effect on the success rate. To avoid  cherry-picking results 
section-by-section, we will adopt the same screening criterion here as in Section III 
(1 percent), which yields an average overall success rate of 60.3 percent, rather than 
the success-rate-maximizing 50 percent criterion. Our conclusions are not substan-
tially affected by applying less restrictive screens.
As in Section III, we perform an initial check on the validity of the model’s pre-
dictive probability statements by comparing the typical probabilistic prediction with 
the average overall success rate. On average, the procedure predicts that items will 
fall into the more likely half of the rating distribution with 79.7 percent  probability. 
37 This figure represents the overall success rate averaged over the 200 population draws.
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That figure is not close to the average overall success rate of 60.3 percent, and the gap 
is statistically significant ( p < 0.001, two-sided t-test). Consequently, the procedure 
does not generate quantitatively accurate probability statements for the hold-out data.
For a more revealing assessment of the model’s predictive validity, we grouped 
individual predictions into deciles (2,000 predictions in each) based on the predicted 
probability that the hold-out item’s average rating among the hold-out group would 
exceed the median, and then, for each decile, computed the frequency with which 
the hold-out group’s average ratings of those items actually fell above the median. 
Results appear in Figure 5, which shows a strong positive relationship between pre-
dicted probabilities and realized frequencies. The relationship does not, however, lie 
close to the 45-degree line.
To sharpen these impressions, we estimated linear probability models (via 
weighted least squares) relating a binary variable indicating whether the hold-out 
group’s average rating of a hold-out item was above the median, to the predicted 
probability of that event. Pooling all 20,000 predictions, the estimated intercept is 
0.317 (s = 0.006), and the slope is 0.364 (s.e. = 0.010). Adding fixed effects for 
each of the 200 population draws, the coefficient estimates and standard errors are 
the same to three decimal places. We also estimated a separate LPM for each popu-
lation draw. The mean slope is 0.360 (s.e. = 0.158), and the median is 0.354.38 
38 Figure A4 in the online Appendix shows the distribution of the resulting slope coefficients.
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notes: Fraction of items with ratings exceeding the median versus average predicted probabil-
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via bootstrap over the 200 population draws.
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Although these estimates do not support a literal interpretation of the model’s pre-
dictive probability statements, they are directionally accurate. Thus, they provide 
evidence that the predicted probabilities contain a good deal of information that is 
useful for predicting across subjects.
As in our within-group exercise, we also directly predict the average rating using 
a linear regression with LASSO penalty. We then estimate an ordinary least squares 
regression of mean normalized rating (for the hold-out food in the hold-out group) 
on predicted rating for all 20,000 predictions, with fixed effects for each of the 
200 population draws. The constant is −0.002 (s.e. 0.066) and the slope is 0.528 
(s.e. 0.012). The r2 from this regression is 0.091.39 While the results from this exer-
cise are not as strong as for the within-group analysis, the predicted ratings are 
clearly related to the actual ratings of the group.
V. Some Extensions
In this section, we briefly summarize two extensions of our analysis. The first 
investigates whether it is possible to improve upon predictions derived with LASSO 
estimates through the use of alternative statistical tools. The second examines the 
anatomical location of predictive brain activity.
Zou and Hastie (2005) propose a procedure known as the Elastic Net, which 
they argue improves upon LASSO in many settings. The Elastic Net penalty is a 
convex combination of the LASSO (L1) and Ridge (L 2) penalties. Like LASSO, it 
accomplishes variable selection, but has a greater tendency to retain correlated pre-
dictors (e.g., in the current context, activity in neighboring voxels). The procedure 
yields modest improvements. For example, with respect to the first prediction task 
examined in Section IIIB (predicting whether the average food rating for a group is 
above or below the median rating), the overall success rate is unchanged at 73 per-
cent. Notably, however, when we estimate a linear probability model relating an 
above-median indicator variable to the predicted probability that the item falls above 
the median, we obtain a slope coefficient that is close to unity (0.870, s.e. 0.171); 
moreover, we fail to reject the joint hypothesis that the slope is one and the intercept 
(0.064, s.e. = 0.100) is zero ( p = 0.692).
It is natural to wonder whether the predictive voxels are concentrated in regions 
that are known to play important roles in valuation (Rangel and Hare 2010). Because 
LASSO retains only a small handful of predictors (21.1 on average in our analysis) 
and typically discards all but one of any highly correlated set, there is a tendency for 
the predictive voxels to be widely dispersed. That tendency is not necessarily bad 
from a predictive perspective. LASSO may benefit by selecting anatomically dis-
tant voxels with activity that is associated with the underlying value signal but that 
does not mirror localized noise, and indeed the Elastic Net, which in contrast tends 
to retain predictive clusters, performs only marginally better. However, the Elastic 
Net proves more useful in generating images of the anatomical locations of predic-
tive voxels. For the Elastic Net estimates, we find that the predictive voxels are to 
39 Figure A5 in the online Appendix plots the mean normalized rating for each food, averaged over 200 popula-
tion draws, versus the predicted rating for each food, again averaged over the population draws.
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a large extent concentrated in brain regions that are broadly associated with choice 
and value, including the ventral striatum, subgenual cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal 
cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobe.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The preceding analysis points to the feasibility of inferring the choices peo-
ple would make (if given the opportunity) at least in part based on their neu-
ral responses to prospects when they are not making actual decision making. It 
represents an important and challenging milestone in the process of developing 
methods for estimating choice mappings that could be used in settings where per-
tinent choice data are nonexistent, limited, or contaminated by spurious factors, 
so that more conventional methods of estimation are inapplicable or problematic. 
Possible examples include inferring willingness to pay for new products or for the 
avoidance of environmental damage, controlling for unobserved product charac-
teristics in supply-and-demand estimation, and the estimation of the behavioral 
impact of interventions where naturally occurring events are insufficiently clean 
to permit reliable inferences.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. Our procedure is 
entirely unsuccessful for nearly half of our subjects. Moreover, even for subjects to 
whom it is applied successfully, in many instances it yields relatively weak predic-
tions (e.g., predicted probabilities near 50 percent rather than 100 percent), and 
consequently achieves only a moderate overall success rate (68.2 percent).
We note, however, that our procedure also yields strong predictions in many 
instances. For the individual-level models, the degree of resolution is reasonably high 
overall, and the models are well calibrated for just over half of our subjects. Compared 
with the successful half of our individual-level prediction exercises, our group-level 
prediction exercise achieves higher resolution, and the quality of calibration is compa-
rable (though somewhat lower), despite the fact that we include all subjects, regardless 
of whether their individual-level prediction exercises were successful.
In addition, there is every reason to believe that refinements of the procedure will 
ultimately yield substantial improvements in predictive accuracy. Better methods 
can be developed to enhance attentiveness in the scanner and to weed out inattentive 
subjects. Advancements in knowledge of the brain and improved statistical methods 
may provide better guides to voxel selection. Technological advances will undoubt-
edly enhance our ability to detect and measure stimulus-specific neural responses.
Perhaps the greatest potential for improving predictive accuracy lies in explor-
ing combinations of nonchoice responses to potential prospects. One promising 
avenue is to supplement fMRI information with subjective nonchoice responses, 
such as hypothetical choices, response times, and visual fixations, as well as other 
 neurometric data, such as pupil dilation,40 facial temperature and muscle move-
ment, SCRs, and the like. The latter types of measurements are easier and less 
costly to obtain than fMRI data, and may ultimately turn out to be highly predictive. 
40 See Kang et al. (2009) (response times) and Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010) (pupillometry).
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Physiological responses may prove particularly valuable in detecting discrepancies 
between hypothetical statements and true tendencies.
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